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LECTURE
Key Points
 
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, Second Edition: 
What Has Changed Over the Past Decade, and What Lies Ahead?
Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte, and Matthew Spalding, PhD
No. 1260 | March 11, 2015
 n The Heritage Guide to the Con-
stitution, released in 2005, 
was the first comprehensive 
commentary on each clause of 
the Constitution to appear in 
many decades.
 n In the past 10 years, there 
has been much new research 
and thinking on the theory of 
originalism, and the courts have 
been paying more attention to 
the Constitution as it was origi-
nally understood.
 n The second, fully revised edition 
of the Guide addresses the latest 
developments in constitution-
al law.
 n We have debated the Constitu-
tion from the very beginning; the 
American Revolution in many 
ways was a debate on and effort 
of constitutional reform.
 n Today, Americans are once 
again debating the Constitution: 
discussing federalism, checks 
on power, and other aspects 
of our constitutional republic. 
Now we need a fusion of judicial 
originalism, scholarly original-
ism, and political originalism to 
advance the Founders’ vision for 
our Constitution.
Abstract: The heritage Guide to the constitution, first released in 
2005, brought together more than 100 of the nation’s best legal experts 
to provide line-by-line examination of each clause of the Constitution 
and its contemporary meaning—the first such comprehensive com-
mentary to appear in many decades. The heritage Guide to the con-
stitution: Fully revised Second Edition takes into account a decade of 
Supreme Court decisions and legal scholarship on such issues as gun 
rights, religious freedom, campaign finance, civil rights, and health 
care reform. The Founders’ guiding principles remain unchanged, yet 
a number of Supreme Court decisions over the past decade remind us 
that those principles still require constant and spirited defense. What 
is needed today is a fusion of judicial originalism, scholarly original-
ism, and political originalism to advance the Founders’ vision for 
our Constitution.
EDWIN MEESE III: We are looking at several things today. 
First, in opening our deliberations this morning, I think we all 
remember that this is the anniversary of 9/11, the attack on the 
United States. Some of us are old enough to remember Pearl harbor, 
but we all remember 9/11. I think in our own way we will not let this 
day go by without remembering the attack on the United States, but 
more particularly the heroic actions of so many of our fellow citi-
zens that day.
Since that time, I think all of us have been devoted to continuing 
to make sure that we are doing what we can to preserve the Unit-
ed States, to preserve the freedoms that we have. Today, while the 
battles are still continuing against those who literally are taking up 
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/hl1260
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage 
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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arms against the freedoms found throughout the 
world, we continue to have those who are fighting 
them in our thoughts and prayers.
In these proceedings today, we recognize two 
beginnings. First is the launch of the second edition 
of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution,1 but also it is 
the first in our 2014 Preserve the constitution series. 
We started this as a way in which heritage, and partic-
ularly the center for legal and Judicial Studies, pays 
attention to and talks about, and we hope provokes 
thinking about, the constitution of the United States.
William Gladstone, who was a former prime 
minister of England, once said that it was the most 
magnificent document ever drafted. he was talking 
about this as a person who was the prime minister 
of a country that had an unwritten constitution. Our 
constitution was the first of its kind to be written, 
to have an actual contract between the citizens and 
their government, and particularly to have a docu-
ment which limited the power of government.
In most countries, you have a monarch or some 
other principal person to whom its officers and its 
military swear their allegiance. Our officials in this 
country and our military swear allegiance to the 
constitution. We say that when we say the Pledge of 
allegiance to the Flag. So the constitution has a par-
ticularly important part in the lives of all of our citi-
zens, and that is why we felt the necessity of remind-
ing people and, particularly, seeking to have people 
have greater understanding of what the constitu-
tion is all about and what it actually provides.
In The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, you 
find a most remarkable collection of scholarly work. 
Over a hundred people have contributed to explain-
ing what the constitution says, what it means, how 
it has been interpreted over the years, and how it is 
important to people today. The Guide to the Constitu-
tion is now used by a number of our Members of con-
gress, and it’s a very hopeful sign that many of them 
boast that they have it on their desk as a frequent 
guide to their actions and what they do in represent-
ing the people in the legislative branch.
I wish that the same fidelity to the constitution 
carried forward into the executive branch. On occa-
sion, the understanding that is contained in The 
Heritage Guide would be very helpful to increase 
the fidelity to that particular document. as a matter 
of fact, it should be useful also to those in the third 
branch of government, the judicial system.
It is also useful to citizens themselves. There have 
been a lot of books written about the constitution, 
but I would suggest to you that The Heritage Guide 
to the Constitution is one that is particularly good in 
terms of making our constitution understandable 
and readily available to everyone in the country to 
use as a guide, to use as a means of understanding 
the basic foundation—the written foundation—of 
the way in which our government should be operated.
So much has happened over the course of the 
last 10 years that we felt it necessary to have a new 
edition of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution to 
bring it up to date so it would be even more valuable 
to all of you who are likely to use it. We hope that it 
will continue to carry on what we at heritage feel is 
very important: the understanding of and allegiance 
to the constitution of the United States.
—Edwin Meese III is Ronald Reagan Distinguished 
Fellow Emeritus at The Heritage Foundation and 
Honorary Chairman of the Editorial Advisory Board 
for The heritage Guide to the constitution.
DAVID FORTE: The first time we did this proj-
ect, it took two and a half years, so when Matt Spald-
ing called me and said we need a revision, I said, “No 
problem.” That “no problem” took one and a half 
years of full-time work because so much has hap-
pened in the last 10 years. From the beginning, Mr. 
Meese was the George Washington of the project: he 
was the one who inspired it, shepherded it through 
heritage, kept it on track, and to him we owe every-
thing that has resulted.
Speaking of George Washington, there is a pro-
fessor at Yale law School, a brilliant man and icon-
oclastic fellow, akhil amar, and a few years ago he 
was suggesting a new method of interpretation of the 
constitution: “What would George Washington do?” 
It is not a bad question. In fact, The Heritage Guide to 
the Constitution asks a slightly larger version of that 
question: “What would the Founders think?”
 n What would the Founders think of a President 
who unilaterally changes the content of federal 
law? See the entry on the “Take care clause” by 
Sai Prakash.
1. David F. Forte and Matthew Spalding, eds., The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Fully Revised Second Edition, Foreword by Edwin Meese III 
(Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2014).
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 n What would the Founders think of a President 
who engages military forces abroad without 
needing to seek the formal approval of congress? 
See the entry on “commander in chief” by John 
Yoo and Michael D. ramsey.
 n What would the Founders think of a governmen-
tal agency that tells you what to do with your land 
because there may be surface moisture on part of 
it for part of the year? See the note on “adminis-
trative agencies” by Michael Uhlmann.
 n What would the Founders think of a President 
who makes recess appointments while congress 
is only in temporary adjournment? See the entry 
on “recess appointments” by Michael carrier 
and Michael rappaport.
 n What would the Founders think of a congress 
that sends the President a bill containing thou-
sands of new laws and regulations and spending 
authorizations that effectively prevents the Pres-
ident from exercising his constitutional power of 
veto? See the entry on the “Presentment clause.”
 n What would the Founders think of a Supreme 
court that supplants the state’s police powers 
with the court’s own view of what, for example, 
constitutes human life? See the entry on the “Due 
Process clause” by James Ely, Jr.
Perhaps more important, what would the Fram-
ers think of what has happened to the separation 
of powers? That brilliant constitutional invention 
was designed, on the one hand, to frustrate factions 
and passions while, on the other, to enable coopera-
tion for the common good. The result, the Framers 
hoped, would be an effective government that still 
protected the people’s liberties and security.
Elements of the Separation of Powers
as created by the Framers, as explained by The 
Federalist Papers, and as practiced by the Founding 
generation, the separation of powers has a number 
of elements. let’s look at these elements, and we 
might be able to gauge just how well we have done 
with those gifts that have been bequeathed to us by 
the Founders.
First, having separate constituencies is an ele-
ment of the separation of powers. The constitution 
required that each element of government be peo-
pled by individuals who were chosen in a particu-
lar way to prevent a majority and a possibly tyran-
nical faction from gaining power. The people chose 
the house of representatives. The states chose the 
Senate. a separately constituted college of Electors 
chose the President. and the President and Senate 
chose and approved a specially trained group of peo-
ple to be the judiciary. Moreover, the double security 
of our freedoms—as James Madison put it—was to 
limit the range of power of the federal government as 
a whole, leaving the enormous residue to the states.
Separation of powers was designed, on 
the one hand, to frustrate factions and 
passions while, on the other, to enable 
cooperation for the common good. The 
result, the Framers hoped, would be an 
effective government that still protected 
the people’s liberties and security.
What is the situation today of the element of sep-
arate constituencies? The Seventeenth amendment 
has removed the states from choosing Senators. The 
college of Electors remains, but presidential elec-
tions have become more of a popularity contest, and 
even appointments to the courts are now tinged with 
political objectives.
The second element of the separation of powers is 
partial agency. as James Madison explained in Fed-
eralist No. 47, partial agency means that one branch 
of government is given a key role in the operations 
of another branch. The President’s veto is part of 
the legislative process. Through the Necessary and 
Proper clause, congress sets and regulates much of 
what happens in the executive and judicial branch-
es. The President nominates members of the judi-
ciary. The Senate must approve principal executive 
appointments as well as treaties.
but for partial agency to work, something more 
must happen. The branches must be willing to deal 
with one another, to be agencies in one another. It 
does not help if the President is not an agent in the 
functioning of the legislative branch, if he simply is 
absent, if he seeks to act unilaterally. It does not help 
if the house and Senate do not speak to one another. 
I’m not sure that this method of partial agency has 
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much currency in the governance in Washington at 
the present time.
Third, the political process keeps in check the 
elements of government. What Madison called “the 
republican principle”—an appeal to the people—
keeps selfish minorities from exercising power over 
the majority. Thus, the people can change who are 
to be Members of congress or who is to be the Presi-
dent if they enact bad policy or exceed their powers.
but do political checks work today? certainly, 
elections continue to matter and to direct the coun-
try in one direction or another, but what kind of polit-
ical checks do we have on the host of independent 
agencies seemingly accountable to no one? What 
kind of political check do we have on the Environ-
mental Protection agency or the Internal revenue 
Service? What kind of political check is there on a 
President who no longer has to answer to the people?
What Madison called “the republican 
principle”—an appeal to the people—
keeps selfish minorities from 
exercising power over the majority. 
Thus, the people can change who are 
to be Members of Congress or who is 
to be the President if they enact bad 
policy or exceed their powers.
Fourth, there is the moral sense of self-restraint. 
This is a significant element in the separation of 
powers. checking won’t do everything. That is what 
chief Justice John Marshall understood in Marbury 
v. Madison (1803) when he eschewed any attempt 
of the judiciary to involve itself in the political dis-
cretionary work of the executive branch, when he 
interpreted article III to allow congress the widest 
range of regulating the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme court. This principled manner of acting as 
a self-restrained republican leader was exemplified 
by George Washington.
recall the restraint shown by congress when it 
considered limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme court but chose not to do so on the argu-
ment that it might disable the courts from perform-
ing their separation of powers function. The judicia-
ry restrains itself by a host of procedural rules, such 
as standing, jurisdiction, ripeness, or the doctrine 
of non-justiciability, when the courts refrain from 
deciding an issue lest they intrude upon the appro-
priate functions of another branch. These are self-
restrained elements that a limited and republican 
government imposes upon itself.
Fifth, the constitution does allow for extraor-
dinary actions when there is a crisis of someone or 
some element exceeding his allotted power. Those 
actions are impeachment and the amendment pro-
cess. both were intended to be very limited, and both 
have been very limited. They are designed to be used 
only in the most extreme kind of situation.
Sixth—and not many people think about this—is 
non-compliance. There are times when one branch 
so invades the core functioning of another branch 
that the other branch will simply say that it will not 
obey. let me give you some examples.
right after the civil War, congress attempted to 
determine the outcome of a particular case before 
the Supreme court through legislation. In United 
States v. Klein (1871), the Supreme court said that 
congress cannot, under its allotted powers, pre-
scribe a rule or decision of the court: that is, tell the 
court how to decide a case. rather, reaching a deci-
sion is what the courts do. In a more recent case, the 
Supreme court held that congress could not reopen 
a case that had already been decided by legislation.
Every President from richard Nixon to the pres-
ent has said that the War Powers resolution con-
strains some of the essential commander-in-chief 
power of the President. recent Presidents stake out 
their own exclusive powers in signing statements 
when they declare that parts of acts of congress 
intrude into the exclusive powers of the presidency.
Unilateral Presidential Actions
This leads to the question of unilateral presiden-
tial actions, which may be justified non-compliance 
or may exceed constitutional limits. What are the 
powers of the President over acts of another branch 
that he regards as unconstitutional? after all, he 
takes an oath to support and defend the constitution.
his primary method is to veto unconstitution-
al acts. The constitution gives that to him directly. 
In fact, George Washington did not believe that his 
veto extended beyond unconstitutional acts. he 
would not veto unpopular acts or those he thought 
were bad policy. but because it is hard to draw the 
line between the veto of an unconstitutional act 
and an act of bad policy, we have accepted that it is 
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perfectly proper for the President to veto acts he 
regards as imprudent.
but what about non-compliance with the law 
after it has been passed and signed but the Presi-
dent thinks it is unconstitutional? There the line is 
not so clearly on the President’s side. If the Presi-
dent decides not to comply with a law because it 
intrudes upon his essential constitutional powers, 
that is one thing, but if he withholds enforcing a 
validly passed law simply because he thinks it (or 
a part of it) is unconstitutional, that is another sit-
uation altogether. certainly, the Framers did not 
want to lodge in the President a unilateral veto of 
laws already passed.
If the President decides not to  
comply with a law because it intrudes 
upon his essential constitutional 
powers, that is one thing, but if he 
withholds enforcing a validly passed 
law simply because he thinks it is 
unconstitutional, that is another 
situation altogether. The Framers did 
not want to lodge in the President a 
unilateral veto of laws already passed.
and certainly the separation of powers is not on 
the President’s side when he decides not to comply 
with acts that he thinks are bad policy, for under the 
Faithful Execution of the laws clause, he is obliged 
to follow and execute validly passed laws. What we 
have seen lately are, for example, unilateral actions 
outside of statutory authorization or the actual 
changing of the text of the law.
Thus, we come back to the sense of moral self-
restraint as essential to the proper separation of 
powers mechanism in our country. This is what the 
Founders called public virtue. Why do we see so lit-
tle of it today?
Professor Phillip Munoz of Notre Dame has given 
us a clue. he notes that, as we all know, in 1938, the 
Supreme court left off the business of checking con-
gress. No longer would it enforce the limits of the 
commerce Power upon congress, or the Spending 
Power. To a large extent, the Supreme court has also 
left off limiting the President.
What has the Supreme court done since then? It 
has said, “Our job is to protect rights,” and what has 
been the result? It has left congress under no sense 
of constraint, so congress now can regulate under 
the commerce and Spending Powers, believing it 
has no limit to what it can regulate.
The Supreme court, as the exclusive guardian of 
rights, thought of itself as the wise repository of what 
rights are, and it went into the business of creat-
ing new rights that had been completely beyond the 
ken of the Founding generation. and the President, 
already given discretionary power by the Framers in 
order to check what they had feared would be a more 
powerful legislature, now moves far beyond what 
the executive power is.
So what the result has been is that the Supreme 
court has left the field of checking—of being faithful 
to the commands of the constitution—and that the 
branches no longer feel an obligation to check one 
another. by not doing so, they are tempted to leave 
off the greatest element of the separation of powers: 
that of their own moral self-restraint.
Thus, what is needed most in this country is to 
return to the original vision and experience of the 
Founders as a renewed sense among our public lead-
ers, among the politicians we elect, of public virtue 
and respect of the individual rights of the people and 
the limits of what government is entitled to do.
—David Forte is Professor of Law at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law and Senior Editor of The 
heritage Guide to the constitution.
MATTHEW SPALDING: This is actually a very 
important occasion to look ahead not only to the 
anniversary of the constitution next week, but to 
the publication of this volume. The first one was in 
2005, so we are just under 10 years since that one 
came out.
It is quite an amazing thing. I have to agree with 
David’s comments. Ed Meese, whom I had the life-
time privilege of working for, saw the possibilities of 
this book, this project from the very beginning—as 
did Phil Truluck, I would add. They saw the possi-
bilities. There was this great scholar and teacher out 
there named David Forte, whom I got to work with, 
and I was merely young enough and naïve enough 
to think we could actually do it. and though it was 
many years, we accomplished the feat.
I think it is a project that is going to be hard—
if ever—to replicate. We had this idea from the 
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beginning that we would go clause by clause by 
clause; we would not skip a one. as David will recall, 
it was hard sometimes finding a scholar to write on 
some of those obscure clauses, but 10 years later, we 
have produced another volume.
Much has happened in the last 10 years, which 
leads me to think we need a new originalism, or 
at least a return to originalism. We have debated 
the constitution from the very beginning—indeed, 
before the constitution itself. The american revo-
lution in many ways was a debate and effort of con-
stitutional reform: how do we take what we have 
learned from british constitutionalism and the rule 
of law and bring it to america in written form?
James Madison wrote that there 
were two compacts to the American 
Founding: the Declaration of 
Independence, asserting the ends of 
American government, equal rights, 
consent of the governed for the 
sake of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, and the Constitution, 
which creates the institutions and 
political array by which we express 
our consent and govern ourselves.
James Madison wrote that there were two com-
pacts to the american Founding. One was the Dec-
laration of Independence, asserting the ends of 
american government, equal rights, consent of the 
governed for the sake of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness. The other was the constitution: that 
act of law-giving which orders our politics, secures 
our rights, defines our nation; that constitutes us, 
creates the institutions and political array by which 
we express our consent and govern ourselves.
From the moment the constitution was writ-
ten, and during its writing, we debated it. One need 
merely look to the debates of the Federalists and the 
anti-Federalists.
The first histories of the american Founding—
John Marshall’s, David ramsey’s, Mercy Otis War-
ren’s—talk about the period of the constitution, but 
they have a problem: Madison’s notes weren’t avail-
able to them, so they skip over that. Joseph Story’s 
three-volume Commentaries on the Constitution, 
which we use in many cases as our guide, from 1833, 
talks about the text of the constitution but very lit-
tle about the convention.
This changed with the publication of Madison’s 
notes in 1840. George bancroft’s great History of the 
United States looks at them extensively, opening up 
more debate about what exactly was intended. The 
first group to use those notes was the abolitionists, 
who used them to criticize the constitution. The 
debate over slavery was, of course, central to under-
standing the constitution, an argument which I 
would suggest was resolved when lincoln properly 
recalled the nation to the Founders’ constitution.
The Rise of Progressivism
This all changed after the civil War when the Pro-
gressives set out to create a movement to redefine 
what the constitutional republic meant. This revolt 
against formalism had various forms: theology, histo-
ry, law, politics, and social policy. Scholars like James 
allan Smith and, most famously, charles beard argue 
that the constitution represented the triumph of 
moneyed elites protecting their economic interests.
Progressive historians assert that democratic 
forces of the american revolution, having produced 
an idealistic Declaration of Independence, were 
later defeated by reactionary forces that produced 
an anti-democratic constitution. The constitution’s 
focus on restricting government power and moder-
ating democratic opinion was viewed as misguided—
a serious barrier to extensive government necessary 
for progress. The result was that the constitution 
must be made flexible, pliable, and “living.”
It turns out the judiciary would play a key role 
in all of this. Justice Oliver Wendell holmes, Jr., 
famously argued, “The life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience”—a key factor in the 
development and interpretation of the law based 
on the consideration of the “felt necessities of the 
time.” In this view, for outcome-oriented jurispru-
dence, later called legal realism, judging is not dis-
tinct from legislating, but merely a different form of 
it, filling in the gaps, so to speak, created by general 
laws. Judges determine not only what the constitu-
tion says, but also certain questions about, in effect, 
what policies will best harmonize with the docu-
ment’s presumptions.
The response to the claims of Progressives came 
in several forms. historians like robert brown and 
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Forrest McDonald argued against the economic 
interpretation, and major academics attempted to 
forge an alternative historical consensus emphasiz-
ing lockean principles of classical liberalism and 
republican consensus of Whig ideology. Over time, 
these historical, scholarly debates turned attention 
increasingly to a reconsideration of the Founders’ 
ideas and political thought; see the essays of Doug-
lass adair and Martin Diamond that rival the Feder-
alist Papers.
Meanwhile, constitutional historians and prac-
titioners argued against the Progressives. Scholars 
of the time such as Edwin S. corwin and andrew 
Mclachlan defended traditional constitutional-
ism as a means to order and restrain government. 
We think of jurists like William howard Taft and 
George Sutherland, the National association for 
constitutional Government, and publications like 
The Constitutional Review.
Then there were political figures. In many ways, I 
would argue that the modern political conservative 
movement began with the republican convention 
of 1912, when several important figures, particularly 
henry cabot lodge and Elihu root, took a stand in 
the name of the constitution against Theodore roo-
sevelt. They were followed by others, perhaps most 
famously and most articulately by calvin coolidge.
The Progressive view came to maturity in the 
New Deal, and the response to the New Deal and 
the later Warren Supreme court led eventually to 
the revival of traditional constitutionalism of the 
Founding, or what attorney General Ed Meese in his 
important speeches of 1985 and 1986 called “a juris-
prudence of original intention.” The thrust of recov-
ering constitutionalism against the Progressives was 
very successful: he made it nationally prominent in 
this debate. This changed how the Senate thought 
about these questions and how the public looked at 
the courts and led to great research and education of 
judges, some of whom still sit on the Supreme court.
likewise, scholarship continued along its way, 
recovering the thought and action of the american 
Founding. The work of adair and Diamond contin-
ues in the work of various students of political phi-
losophy—the claremont School, now followed by 
many scholars at hillsdale college.
The weakest point of this broad sense of original-
ism, and my point today, is that the weakness is not 
in our politics. The New Deal weakened that part, 
destroyed the base of constitutional originalism 
in the political field. conservatism in its early days 
looked to many places for its sense of authority. Tra-
ditionalists looked to burke and other European 
thinkers, largely because they were convinced that 
Progressive scholars were right about the consti-
tution. at the same time, there is a rising interest 
in economic analysis, warning about a new road to 
serfdom—all very good but not that constitutional 
(or political, for that matter).
In many ways, the modern political 
conservative movement began with 
the Republican Convention of 1912, 
when several important figures, 
particularly Henry Cabot Lodge 
and Elihu Root, took a stand in the 
name of the Constitution against 
Theodore Roosevelt.
Neither fully embraced the american Founding. 
The fusion of conservatism was more a result of the 
cold War. The more recent popular turn of conser-
vatism back to the Founders can be traced to ronald 
reagan, again contributed to greatly by Ed Meese.
The Founders’ Constitutionalism  
vs. the “Living Constitution”
but on this aspect of the originalist movement, I 
think we need to do more work. I am struck reading 
Ed Meese’s speeches again—looking at how much 
he emphasized structure and form; the distinction 
between the constitution, as he says, and constitu-
tional law. It is about court and branch construction. 
The Supreme court was not the only interpreter: 
Each branch had a duty to interpret as it performed 
its functions.
Unfortunately, originalism in the popular sense 
of shaping politics has come to be associated with 
the courts. It has been less consistently and rigor-
ously applied to other departments, especially from 
the point of view of those departments. It is now 
time for an equivalent scholarship of that aspect, 
originalism, and argument, and more work needs to 
be done.
If there is anything we see in the pages of this 
great book, it is a clear divide growing over time 
between the Founders’ constitutionalism and the 
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“living constitution” given to us by the Progressives. 
although shaped by the courts, the regime created 
by the Progressives, the very concept of it, is politi-
cal and comprehensive. It is a new administrative 
order, a bureaucratic order, a new form of governing 
that threatens to overwhelm us, threatens self-gov-
ernment, and threatens to take away our consent.
The courts cannot restore the 
Constitution by themselves. 
This is partially a question of 
institutional capacity, but also 
the natural arguments of judicial 
restraint and politics, especially 
constitutional politics.
The courts cannot restore the constitution by 
themselves. This is partially a question of institu-
tional capacity, but also the natural arguments of 
judicial restraint and politics, especially constitu-
tional politics—arguments that bring in the popu-
lar opinion needed to reconstruct a constitution-
al government.
The rise of the Tea Party has been one of the most 
important aspects of recent political history, espe-
cially since the publication of our first edition of The 
Heritage Guide to the Constitution. That is our oppor-
tunity: The Progressive project, it seems, has not yet 
been settled; it is up for debate. here they are, all of 
these americans turning back to the Declaration of 
Independence and the constitution. Their instincts 
are good: They talk less about rights and the bill of 
rights and more about structure. They want to talk 
about federalism, checks on power—all for the good, 
but it needs to grow more, to mature and deepen.
I do not think we have sufficiently articulated the 
constitutional arguments needed right now in poli-
tics. I fear sometimes we are overly technical and 
legalistic—judicial, if you will. We object to what the 
President’s doing. While we can make a good techni-
cal argument about whether we should do this or not, 
“let’s sue him” does not strike me as a good constitu-
tional political argument of how the house of repre-
sentatives should deal with the President by going to 
a third branch to ask permission.
There is an important distinction between what 
Jim ceasar calls legalistic constitutionalism—rules 
decide cases, definitive answers enforced by courts—
and political constitutionalism, what I call consti-
tutional politics, that emphasizes political actors 
who are making political decisions in the political 
realm in light of the constitution. They both must 
work together.
We need a new fusionism in the conservative 
movement between judicial originalism—scholarly 
originalism, if you will—and political originalism. 
Each has a contribution, but they are unique in what 
they do. There are important legal questions, but 
the most important issues in our politics right now 
require prudence: that is, political prudence, not just 
jurisprudence. legalistic constitutionalism is nec-
essary but insufficient for the task.
What would this look like? very briefly, it would 
emphasize distinctions of principle—say between 
constitutional government and the rule of bureau-
crats, equal rights for all, special privileges for none. 
It would talk about the purposes of government. It 
would emphasize the constitutionalism of individu-
al branches, the separation of powers as David talk-
ed about, federalism, checks on power, an aspect of 
constitutional interpretation.
If the judiciary does not have the sole claim on 
interpretation, “the final say” as Ed Meese likes to 
say, the legislative branch and the executive also 
interpret the constitution through what is called 
construction. We need to think more about con-
stitutional construction, more scholarship on that, 
more writing about it, the application of meaning in 
particular circumstances. 
 n how do you amend something in a way that 
makes it more constitutional, recognizing it still 
has a constitutional problem?
 n how do you deal with things like entitlements?
 n how do you drive a wedge between the adminis-
trative state, which we really object to, and other 
things we can possibly accommodate?
The legislative branch does not have to follow 
the precedence of the courts: They have to build 
consensus, move political opinions, and create gov-
erning coalitions. and the legislature and execu-
tive, the popular branches, can rally the people as 
reagan did, which gave rise to modern originalism 
in the first place. These decisions are less definitive, 
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often temporary, less technical, and partial, but pol-
itics looks for results over the long term. They are 
directional, and that is how you reform the lines of 
the debate.
In the end, having originalism in the court room, 
it seems to me, is necessary and important but 
insufficient for the task of constitutional revival. 
We need something more dynamic, about checks 
and balances, robust federalism, political figures 
making the case, arguing, and deliberating—per-
haps even making compromises—to preserve the 
constitution. That is the Madisonian solution, I 
would argue.
The work to be done recovering the constitution 
is to be done by statesmen in the end, in the realm of 
politics, in ordinary policy, and issues that go beyond 
what the courts can do. It strikes me that this is the 
original originalism—Ed Meese’s originalism—con-
sistent with the original intention of the Framers, 
and it is time to pursue that. Pursuing originalism 
is a larger project to which this book and all of our 
work contribute.
—Matthew Spalding, PhD, is Associate Vice 
President and Dean of Educational Programs 
at Hillsdale College and Executive Editor of The 
heritage Guide to the constitution.
